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ELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

May 23,
List 1,
No. 84-1580 CFY
United States

Cert to CA3 (Adams, Higginbotham
and Van Dusen)

v.
Inadi (narcotics)

1.

Federal/Criminal

CONTENTIONS RAISED IN REPLY BRIEF:

May 17, 1985,

In a reply filed on
that petr contends

flatly conflict with
first,

Timely

the CA3's decision

United States v. Molt,

No.

in

this case.

85-108 @

In the

pril 1, 1985),

the court held that the ND Ind. correctly denied the defendant
bail

pending

Gr~
-~

'·

"!!.":

,t ..~

appeal

S:4ce ~ ;s ~

is~~AP,

r

the

because

CA

V0~1d ~~J ~

issue

---

he

raised

was

c~-P/.,cf ~ -(L f&~~

insubstantial.

The

conversations

between

conspirators

was

issue

raised

the

was

defendant

admissible

without

,whether
and

any

evidence

his

of

alleged

showing

that

co-

the

co-

The

CA7

~

conspirators

were

unavailable

for

cross-examination.

co-conspirators'
statements

should

801 (d) (2) (E)

be

based

on

the

requirements

Id.,

slip

op.

Williams,

F.2d

595,

610

737

at

2

(quoting

(CA7 1984).

United

nonetheless

was

States

The court

that the CA3 had held to the contrary in Inadi,
issue

Rule

[of the Federal Rules of Evidence], not on the Sixth

Amendment.'"

the

of

insubstantial

v.

recognized

but stated that

because

the

CA7

was

unlikely to re-examine its view that there is no requirement that
the declarant be un~ able.
In the second, Boone v. Marshall, No. 84-3536 (CA6 April 29,
1985)'

the

conspirator's

court

held

statement

that
under

satisfies the Sixth Amendment.

evidence
the

admitted

hearsay

rules

as

a

co-

automatically

It does not appear that the issue

was unavailability, rather than reliability, however, because the
court stated

that

the declarant would have

taken

the Fifth if

called to the stand.

2.

DISCUSSION:

conflict with

The CA 7' s

opinion

the CA3's decision.

in Molt

doe

Never the less,

the

wish to allow the issue to percolate further.

It might also be

more efficient to wait to address the issue in a case that also
poses the reliability issue, which has sharply split the Courts
of Appeals.
3.

RECOMMENDATION:

May 20, 1985

I recommend denial.

Been

Opn in petn

•.
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Cert to CA3 (Adams, Higqinbotham
and Van Dusen)

United States
v.

Inadi (narcotics)

Timely

Federal/Criminal

5G-~:~~~~

~~--,}Gz;t;r
1.
SUMMARY:
The qovernment

~~~h

contends that the CA3 erred in

holdin~?hefCJrrl;,e~c~~e~o~

hu--vt---.

conspirator's
requires

the

out-of-court
prosecution

statement,
to

the

establish

Confrontation
the

Clause

co-conspirator's

2.

/

ED

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Pa,

resp

distribute
drug

was

methamphetamine,

felony,

felony,

convicted

causing

of

After a jury trial in the

conspirfng

using

the

interstate

telephone

travel

to

and distributing methamephetamine.

consisted

of

the

testimony

of

an

to

manufacture
to

and

faci 1 i tate

facilitate

a

a

drug

The evidence at trial

unindicted

co-conspirator,

McKeon, who stated that he had an aareement with resp that he and
another

unindicted

methamphetamine

with

responsible

distributing

that

he

for

chemicals

supplied

at a

"cook"

to

third attempt.

an

empty

house

by

would
resp,

the final product.

successfully manufactured

failed

Levan,

co-conspirator,

in

who

May,

would

be

McKeon reported

two batches of

He took

manufacture

the drug,

but

the residue from that third
New Jersey,

where

he,

resp,

Levan, co-conspirator Lazaro, and two others attempted to extract
methamphetamine from the residue.

~olice

Acting pursuant to a warrant,

surreptitiously searched the house and removed the tray in

which the residue was being dried.
DEA agents
between

resp

testified at

and

Lazaro

in

restaurant on May 25, 1980.

trial
the

that

parking

they observed a meeting
lot

of

a

Philadelphia

Because they observed resp lean into

the car at one point, the DEA agents followed Lazaro, stopped him,
and

searched

the

car.

The agents

found

nothing,

although

they

later returned to the scene of the search and found a plastic bag
containing methamphetamine, which apparently had been thrown under
the car during

the search.

The evidence admitted at trial also

consisted of five telephone conversations the Cape May police had

t

lawfully

intercepted

between

May

23

to

May

27,

1980.

In

the

/

first,

Lazaro asked resp in code for methamphetamine and reported

on the residue missing from the Cape May ' house.

In the second,

Lazaro and resp arranged the meeting that the DEA agents observed.
In the third, Lazaro reported to resp that he had been stopped by
the DEA agents, but had managed to kick the plastic bag under the
car.

The fourth conversation involved a discussion between McKeon

and Lazaro's wife about the DEA agents stopping the car, and the
fifth,

which was between Levan and Lazaro,

involved a discussion
stop~

of the missing residue and the May 25th DEA

Resp objected to the admission of the five recordings on the
-"\

grounds

that

conspirator
80l{d) (2) (E),

they

did

not

exception

to

and

that

satisfy
the

the

the

requirements

hearsay

rule,

introduction

of

of

Fed.

the

R.

Lazaro's

co-

Evid.

statements

violated the Confrontation Clause because the prosecution had not
shown that Lazaro was unavailable to testify.
the

statements

Confrontation
Lazaro's

satisfied

Clause

was

statements.

Rule
not

80l(d) (2) (E),

violated

According

The DC ruled that

to

by

petr,

the
the

that

and

introduction
DC

admitted

the
of
the

statements in reliance upon the prosecution's representation that
Resp
conditionally

admitted

the

prosecution's

representation

maintains

conversations
that

she

in

would

that

reliance
produce

the
on

DC
the

Lazaro and

that he would refuse to testify, and that the DC later lifted the
condition

that

Lazaro

be

produced

without

addressing

resp's

objectionv
The CA3 agreed that Lazaro's statements, which it described

'

as

the

"linchpins"

~

of

the

government's

case,

were

properly

admitted

under

sufficient

Fed.

proof

R.

that

Lazaro

rev~_n
required

that

the

Evid.

the

801Cd) (2) (E)
was

ground

government

a

because

co-c'onspirator.,
'

The

was
court

ere-y~-a-~
""i=o=n=C=l:;-~-u-s-el

that

either

there

produce

Lazaro

for

cross-

examination or establish that he was unavailable to testify.
court

noted

that

this · Court

Clause establishes a
case ..•

stated

that

the Confrontation

"rule of necessity" and that "in the usual

the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the

unavailability of,

the declarant whose statement it wishes to use

~io

against the defendant."
While

has

The

Roberts

exceptional

stated

in

circumstance

unavailability
confrontation

would
was

not

remote,

v.

a

Roberts,

footnote

for

that

which

in
be

448 U.S. 56, 65
there

example,

be

demonstration

a

required,

might

(1980).

where
id. ,

the
at

65

utility
n.

7,

an
of
of
the

prosecution did not rely upon the footnote, and this case does not
present such an exceptional circumstance.
The court rejected the government's argument that it had met
the

burden

Lazaro

of

would

unavailability
established
for

establishing
refuse
that

by Fed.

to
will

R.

unava i labi 1 i ty
The

testify.
satisfy

Ev id 80 4,

the

u.s.

representing

minimal

Confrontation

which defines

the purposes of the hearsay rules,

Barber v. Paoe, 390

by

719, 724-725

read

showing
Clause

that
of
is

"unavai lability"

in conjunction with

(1968), which held that the

government must make a good faith effort to obtain the declarant's
presence at trial.

The government's assertions that Lazaro would

refuse to testify are insufficient,
{

judge

has

experienced

the

because "every veteran trial

situation

where

a

hostile

witness

J

discards

his

contempt citation."
at

the

tactics

'stonewalling'

DC's

Petn 15a.

suggestion,

when

faced

with an

imminent

I

The government issued a subpeona

but

when

Lazaro

failed

to

respond,

allegedly because he had car trouble, the government did not seek
a

bench

warrant,

attendance.

and

made

no

further

efforts

to

secure

his

More is required to satisfy Barber's requirement of a

"good faith effort."

The court noted that trial judges would have

discretion to determine what

is a

sufficient effort in light of

the circumstances of the case, and implied that an affidavit from
the declarant that he would not testify would be sufficient.

The

~

court remanded for a new trial.

The Government petitioned for rehearing en bane, arguing for
the

first

ruling

time

on

remanded
hearing

the

for

that

even assuming

Confrontation

a new trial,

regarding

Lazaro's

--------------------

the correctness of

Clause,

the

court

the CA3 's

should

not

have

but should instead have remanded for a
availab i_lity.

Rehearing

was

denied,

with Judges Hunter, Garth, Sloviter and Becker voting to grant.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG contends that the case presents an

issue of great practical and doctrinal
the circuits.

importance that has split

The CA3's holding that the government must either

produce the declarant or show that the declarant is unavailable is

/

in accord with the holdings of the CA9, United States v. Ordonez,
737 F.2d 793,
F.2d~ ,

the CAS,

88

802

(1984),

the ~ ,

United States v. Lisotto,

(CA4 1983), cert. denied, No. 83-1417

United States v. Peacock,

654 F.2d 339,

722

(Mar. 26, 1984),
349-350

(1981),

v

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983), and the Wisconsin state courts,

'

State v. Bauer, 109 Wis.2d 204, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982).

~

The First,

/ Slxth,
·

v-

-...--

and Seventh Circuits,

and the South Dakota courts, on the

~~lling G hinl
---satisfy the Confrontation

other hand, have taken the position _that statements

------··-·

the

co-conspirator

Clause.

rule

--------.._

.

automatically

-

---~

~------------------------------

United States v.

Kendall,

665 F.2d 126,

133

CCA7 1981),

cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); United States v. Swainson, 548
F.2d 657,

661 (CA6), cert. denied, 431

v. United States, 468 F.2d 269,

273

u.s.

937

(1977);

Ottomano

(CAl 1972), cert. denied, 409

U.S. 1128 (1973); State v. Smith, 353 N.W.2d 338, 342 (S.D. 1984).
The Confrontation Clause

does

not

impose

a

requirement

of

unavailability, or any other requirement beyond those embodied in
In ruling

the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

to

the contrary, the CA3 placed too much reliance upon the dictum in
Roberts,

and

erroneously
What

literalness."
dictum
hearsay

was

that

the

where

exception

Roberts

read

Court

must

have

unavailability

rules,

it

will

is

also

be

"unquestioning

with
meant
a
a

in

the

Roberts

requirement

of

the

requirement

of

the

Confrontation Clause.
Finally,

even assuming

that

the CA3 was correct

in holding

that the government must establish unavailability, the court erred
in remanding

for

a new trial rather

than merely remanding for a

hearing to determine whether Lazaro was

in fact unavailable, and

to determine if any error was harmless.

The problem of courts of

appeals

reflexively ordering a

new trial,

when a

limited

remand

would do, is a recurring one that deserves this Court's attention.
Resp

contends

straightforward
(

Confrontation

the

that

application

Clause

and

of

CA3's
the

holding

principles

established

in

reflects

embodied

Roberts,

supra.

in

a
the
This

!

Court

has

made

clear

that

the

hearsay

equivalent of the Confrontation Clause.
Evans,

400

(1970).

U.S.

74

(1970);

rules

are

not

the

exact

Roberts, supra, Dutton v.

California

v.

Green,

399

U.S.

149

The co-conspirator's statement exception to the hearsay

rule is based on the theory that each co-conspirator is the agent
of

the

other,

not

upon

inherently

reliable.

untruthful,

because

another
other

a

belief

Indeed,

that

statements

deliberately

are

often

are

mislead

one

statements

such

co-conspirators

such

in an attempt to encourage continued cooperation, or for

reasons.

Cross-examination of the declarant regarding his

or her reasons for making a statement may be extremely valuable,
and where, as here, the statements were in code, cross-examination
is quite important.
(

slight.

The burden of establishing unavailability is

Production of the witness would not preclude use of the

out-of-court statement.

The government did not raise the issue of

a

its petition

limited

contention

remand

until

that

the

therefore

need

not

suggested

by

the

problem

is

address

government

a

the

for

rehearing,

recurring

The

issue.

would

be

one,

despite

and

limited

meaningless,

Should

in

the

face

of

a

contempt

charge

at

the

Court

hearing

because

hearing will not establish whether Lazaro would have
testify

the

refused

first

its

the
to

trial.

the evidence show that Lazaro would have been available,

there is little likelihood that the trial judge will find that the
denial of the right to cross-examine was harmless error, given the
importance of the statements, the fact that they were in code, and
the

fact

that

the

cross-examination.

government

does

not

contest

the

utility

of

4.

DISCUSSION:

The

SG's

assertion

that

the

circuits

are

.....----·

sharply

split

decision

the

over
SG

decision here,

this

cites

that

issue

squarely

is

just · wrong.

held,

in

accord

CA4

and

the

availability

was

unavailability
statements
involved
prior

hearsay

cites

decisions

not

at

in

in Roberts.

rule,

rather
and

its

quoting

the

CA9

CA3' s

SG

cites,

and

or

Ordonez, supra.

the

the
courts

paraphrasing

was

mentioned

this

Court's

by

the SG

testimony of a victim who died

than the co-conspirator
quotation

In

declarants'

The Wisconsin decision cited

unavailability

indicates that a

the

issue,

the preliminary hearing

concerning

(

CAS

only

to trial,

with

the

the government must establish unavai labi 1 i ty

in order to satisfy the ConLrontation Clause.
the

9n1y

of

the

paragraphs

The

dicta.

exception to the

Arizona

showing of unavailability

in

Roberts

case

the

SG

is required

if

"the statement was made under circumstances which show doubt as to
its

accuracy or

reliability"

or

if

the

statement

is of crucial

importance or extremely prejudicial to the defense, but not if the
utility of confrontation would be insignificant.
139 Ariz. 466, 480
The

v:
only

conflicting
specifically

extrajudicial

(1984).

post-Roberts

with

State v. Martin,

the

discuss

CA3's

federal

decision

decision,

unavailability,

statements

properly

Kendall,
but

the

supra,

broadly

admissible

80l(d) (2) (E) do not violate the Sixth Amendment.

SG

cites

as

does

not

states

that

under

Rule

The remainder of

the allegedly conflicting federal decisions all were decided prior
to this Ct's decision in Roberts.

The South Dakota case the SG

cites as being in conflict specifically refused to reach the issue

of

'I

T

unavailability

because

no objection had

been made

at

trial.

I

Smith, supra, at 341.

Thus, there is no square conflict, and

few

courts appear to have directly addressed the issue since Roberts.
The issue accordingly should be allowed to percolate further.
Court

has

issue

been

reluctant

whether

automatically

to

Roberts'

met

if

the

address

(June 25,

1984)

more
of

requirement

statement satisfies

except ion to the hear say rule,
83-6454

the

see Sanson v.

(WHITE, J.,

diss.

pressing

The

Roberts

reliability

is

the co-conspirator
United States, No.

from denial of cert.),

and I see no need to rush to address the unavailability issue in
the absence of a square conflict.
In Roberts,
Framers'

the Court stated

preference

for

Amendment establishes a

~~ case,

rj

the

that

face-to-face

"in conformance with
accusation,

prosecution

indication

those

that

situations

declarant

to

be

Sixth

rule of necessity" and that in the usual
accordingly

must

either

declarant or establish his or her unavailability.
no

the

the

the

"rule

where

the

unavailable.

of

necessity"

hearsay
Thus,

rules
the

produce

The Court gave

controlled
also

CA3's

the

only

in

required

the

application

of

Roberts is not clear error.
Finally, the issue whether the CA3 should have remanded for a

]

l limited hearing or

for

a

complete new trial is not cert-worthy.

The Court has indicated that where a limited hearing is possible,
retrial should not be ordered, see Goldberg v. United States, 425

u.s.

94, 111-112

(1976), so there is no need to take this case to

establish that principle, especially i:n light of the government's

(

failure to raise the harmless error issue, or ask that a remand be

limited, prior to the petition for rehearing.
/

5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend denial.

There is a response.

May 17, 1985
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United States v. Inadi (CA3

MEMO TO FILE
This case presents a question under the Confrontation
Clause that the SG states that:
"The Court has seldom had before it a
proposed constitutional rule that would add more
to the expense and complexity of criminal trials
while contr ~~ ng less to the reliability of
the outcome
the rule adopted by the Court of
Appeals in this case." Br. p. 10.
The SG also states that CA3 mistakenly relied on the
Confrontation Clause to create a new constitutional rule
when

the

Court

should

have

applied

Rule

801 (d)

of

the

Federal Rules of Evidence that adopts the common law nco---___,
conspirator rule" as an exception to the hearsay rule.

---

Rule 80l(d) provides as follows:
"A statement is not hearsay if ••••• the
statement is offered against a party and is
a statement by a coconspirator of a party during
the
course
and
in
furtherance
of
the
conspiracy." Br. 2.
CA3, applying the Confrontation Clause, held that the
prosecution "may not introduce a coconspirator statement
unless

the

declarant

is

produced

or

the

prosecution

2.

carries

the

burden

unavailable.

The

of

SG

showing

states

the

that

declarant

this

to

be

"constitutional

rule" would "substantially impair the prosecution of crime
with no appreciable benefits."
This Case
Respondent was convicted on 6 counts for conspiracy
to manufacture and distribute methamphetime.

Much of the

evidence was based on 5 telephone conversations that were
transcribed

by

-

a

judicially

---

authorized

conversations were played at the trial for
respondent

had

conversations
respondent

been

-

including

sought

Lazaro and the other
did

801 (d) (2) (B)

not

that

exclude

~

the jury, and

several

in
with

of

Lazaro.

At

the

trial,

the

.......

satisfy

regulates

Respondent

declarations.

those

These

recorded statements of
_.........._...
coconspirators on the ground that the

to
--

-----~

statements

involved

I

wiretaPt ·

Federal

Rule

admission

of

also objected

of

Evidence

coconspirators

with

respect

to

Lazaro's conversation on the ground that since Lazaro was
-----._/

not

produced

Clause

for

required

------

statements.

The

arguments.

The

statements

would

Confrontation
......._____,

cross-examination,
exclusion
DC

ruled

Court

of

be

of

this

against
Appeals

admissible

the

coconspirator's

respondent
agreed

under

the

that

on

both

Lazaro's

Coconspirator

3.

Rule, but the Court went on to hold that the Confrontation
Clause requires the government to show the unavailability
of a non-testifying coconspirator before his out of court
statements may be

admitted

in evidence.

In so holding,

CA3 relied primarily on dictum in our decision in Ohio v.
Roberts,
Court's

448

u.s.

opinion

preference

for

56,

65 (1980).

said

"in

face

to

Amendment establishes a
case

the

demonstrate

conformance
face

the

with

of

the

framers

the

Sixth

In the usual

either

must

unavailability

the

accusation,

rule of necessity.

prosecution

~Rie ~

Unfortunately, the

produce

declarant

or

whose

statement it wishes to use against the defendant."
SG's Argument in brief
Noting that at common law there are many exceptions
to

the

hearsay

Evidence refinement
although

rule,

and

that

dealing with hearsay of

the

hearsay

common

generally

law
is

the

Federal

Rules

are a codification and
In

approach.
inadmissible

summary,

(Rule

802),

--codifies the

One

there are more than tQirty exemptions and exceptions.
~

of these exemptions, Rule 801
law

-

apporved

by

this

(d) (2)E

Court

of

years

ago

-

that

common
permits

) admission of statements made by coconspirators during and
\ in

conspiracy.

the

4.

coconspirator rule is said to be the most frequently used
exception

to

the

developed

as

to

though

the

hearsay
whether

rule,
in

a

coconspirator

but

case

rule

a

sharp

like

this

is

conflict
one

even
th~

satisfied,

Confrontation Clause applies when the government fails to
show

unavailability

of

the

statements

are

be

introduced.

exception,

however,

that

the

the

sought

to

if

coconspirator

whose

There

is

the government can establish

coconspirator

is

unavailable,

and

(ii)

it

an
(i)
is

established that the statements at issue are reliable.
The

SG attributes

the

present confusion

hearsay exception:

that for

when,

a witness

but

for
is

example,

unavailable

for

a

testimony may be admitted.
type

of

hearsay

deposition"
substitute
has,

it
for

tested

Clause,

unavailable.

live

the

unless

"prior recorded testimony" testified

retrial,

analogous

testimony

it

can

to
more

testimony."

former

in a prior

the

prior

trial

recorded

The SG says that because this

"nothing

is

former

and

admissible

is

to another

than

affidavit
an

Accordingly,
under

testimony
be

"an

shown

the

inferior
this Court

Confrontation

normally
that

or

the

is

witness

not
is

5.

The SG argues that CA3 lost sight of the distinction
----------------------------------------~~

between

"prior

testimony"
appli ~·s.

Court

The

"do

contrary,

1

as

recorded

in

testimony"

this case where

government

not

and

support

this

argues
the

Court's

"subsequent

live

the coconspirator

rule

that

approach

decisions
of

this

On

CA3.

Confrontation

of

Clause

the

cases

involving the admission of hearsay take a different threepart approach:

First,

hearsay that

resembles affidavits

or depositions have been closely regulated, and it is j1 n
this

context

unavailability
routed

that
of

hearsay

constitutional.

the

the

prosecution

And

Second,

witness.

exceptions"
third,

are

the

must

show

other

presumed

Court

has

held

the

"firmly
to

be

out

the

possibility that novel hea·rsay exceptions may be subjected
to

more

exacting

Br.

scrutiny".

10

(I

am

not

sure

I

understand this third ground).
Respondent's Argument in Brief
Respondent concedes that the wiretapped conversation
of Lazaro would be admissible under Federal Evidence Rule
8010?????.
whether

But

respondent

states

that

the

"issue

is

the Confrontation Clause affords protection to a

defendant against out of court declarations.
question,

therefore,

is

"whether

the

The narrow

government

was

..

6.

obligated by the Constitution to produce the declarant for
cross-examination or

demonstrate

his

unavailability

... "

(Emphasis supplied by me) •
Like

the

SG,

respondent

also

relies

on

the

early

history of the Confrontation Clause, states that it "does
not provide the answer to the question presented", but it
does "provide useful guidance."
importance of

the

right

Respondent emphasizes the

to cross-examine -

Court also has emphasized many times.
on

Owen

v.

Robert,

supra,

as

a

right

this

Respondent relies

establishing

a

rule

of

necessity to the effect that "the prosecution must either
produce,

or

declarant

whose

unavailability

the

demonstrate
statement

it

wishes

to

use

the

of

against

defendant."
I note here that the foregoing statement in Roberts
is too general to be controlling in this case.

Here,

in

effect we have the live testimony recorded in the wiretap

-------------

of a coconspirator,
admissible.

testimony Rule 801 expressly says is

Respondent's

implicit

statements "admissible under Rule

answer

801 (D) (2) (E)

is

that

are often

without any hint of reliability", and that the rule would
allow

admission

falsehoods."

despite

the

fact

that

they

contained

7.

More significantly, respondent's brief observes that:
"Former testimony, although given under
oath, in the presence of the defendant, and in
fact subjected to cross-examination,
is not
admissible unless the government demonstrates
that its admission is necessary because of the
declarant
is
unavailable.
There
is
no
1
justification for the government's assertion
that coconspirator declarations - not made under
oath, and often not made in the presence of the
defendant,
and
never
subject
to
crossexamination, are not governed by the same clear
rule". Br. p. 8.

I must reread, and do so carefully, the SG's brief.
1

am

not

sure

1

understand

the

rationale

of

his

distinction between testimony given under oath and subject

ff..a_/-

to cross-examination at a prior

trial

:'\

is subject to the

Confrontation Clause, whereas under the Coconspirator Rule
the

unsworn

conversation

of

the

defendant

coconspirators is not subject to Confrontation Clause.

with
In

view of the exigency of the government as to the effect of
CA3's

decision,

1

would

like

for

my

clerk

to

help me

better understand the government's rationale, and whether
it supports the validity of Rule 801 in the circumstances
of this case.
LFP I

JR.

wjs 11/27/85
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Bill

Re:

United States v.

November 27 1 1985

Inadi1 No. 84-1580

Cert to CA3
Argument date:

Dec. 31 1985

Question Presented
Does
to

the Confrontation Clause require

admission

of

co-conspirator

statements 1

as a prerequisite

1

a

showing

that

the

declarant is unavailable to testify at trial?

Statement of Facts
Your memo to the file in this case contains a good factual
summary; I won't repeat it here.

Discussion

Summary

!.

In this case, CA3 decided that Ohio v.
56

(1980)

Roberts,

u.s.

448

requires a showing of unavailability as a prerequisite

to introduction of @ out-of-court declaration offered for
truth,

save when the declaration

cross-examination
certainly

would

defensible,

~berts.

serve

given

is

no

the

so obviously reliable
purpose.

Court's

CA3's

sweeping

its
that

holding

is

language

in

But at least in my view, CA3's holding applies Roberts'

literal

formula

reaches

a

without

reference
Because

silly result.

to
I

its

purpose,

don't

think

and

thereby

that result is

~

compelled by Roberts, I recommend that you vote to reverse.
My analysis does not turn on the parties' arguments about
~e

history of the right of confrontation.

It seems to me that

-

this is an especially bad case in which to rely on history as a
primary guide.

To

the

legal

systems of

17th and 18th century

~

England and 18th and 19th century America,

large-scale criminal

conspiracies--especially of the sort commonly found today in drug
cases--were rare.
statement cases

(Hence the very small number of co-conspirator

that arose

in the 19th century.

Petr at 34-35 (citing cases).)

------

nonexistent.

See Brief for

Moreover, wiretaps were of course

It seems senseless

to decide cases like

this one

based on historical patterns that didn't include cases like this

f.,Ju.."';:--

one.

4

/7~-;.

-/

II.

Ohio v. Roberts and the Unavailability Requirement

,g~

~
~
~

·'•

The
introduce

the

defendant's
Blackmun)
~eery

question

in

Roberts

defendant's

was

daughter's

-------------------hearing.

preliminary
used

these

facts

sworn
The

the ' state
testimony

Court

could

from

(per

the

Justice

to expound at length on the general

of the Confrontation Clause.

quoting in full,

whether

The critical language bears

since resolution of this case turns on how one

reads it:

J-t/t~
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate
ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay.
First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for
face-to-face
accusation,
the
Sixth
amendment
establishes a rule of necessity.
In the /usual cas €1
(including cas es- wn ere prlror cross-examinat i on h as
occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose
statement it wishes to use against the defendant.
See
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408' u.s. 204 (1972); Barber v. Page,
390 u.s. 719 (1968).
See also Motes v. United States,
178 u.s. 458 (1900); California v. Green, 399 u.s., at
161-162, 165, 167, n. 16.
[The Court then discussed
the Confrontation Clause's requirement that out-ofcourt declarations offered for their truth have some
indicia of trustworthiness.]

u.s.,

448

at 65.

One can certainly read this paragraph

----------------------------

did)

1 but the

unavailability
___________..

show
But

the

said

language

that

the

as

a

doesn't

-

paragraph

the

prerequisite
have

unavailability

case," not in all cases.
Court

rare case
to

to be read

(as CA3
___.

the government must

introducing
that way.

requirement applies

hearsay.
The Court

"in the usual

Equally important, at the end of that

dropped

-------

a

footnote

~------------~
that
"[a] ~S"

stating

demonstration of unavailabiity is not always required."
The~~
--~ .
hedges undermine any argument that the Court was adopting a

-------------

definitive rule for all kinds of hearsay.

The limits on the unavailability

~equirement:

become more

clear when one looks at the purpose of the requirement and the
factual circumstances in which it has been imposed.
that

the

requirement

face-to-face

stems

accusation."

from
Ibid.

"the

Framers'

Such

a

Roberts says
preference

preference

for

logically

mplies that when the government has a choice between using outof-court statements and live testimony, it should use the latter,
in order to permit the defendant to test the evidence by crossexamination.

Thus,

in

in

order

unavailability

Roberts,
to

the

use

government

defendant's

daughter's

cites to support the unavailability requirement,
to

use

show
prior

prior

recorded

testimony

in

the government
place

of

liv

~
c~

------------------~~-------~------

testimony.

See Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra: Barber v. Page, supra;

california v. Green,

supra;

Motes v.

logic of these results seems clear.
reason

to

Similarly, in each of the four cases Robert:~~

recorded testimony.

oought

had

to prefer

prior

United States, supra.

The

The government has no valid

recorded testimony over

live testimony,

while the defendant has every reason to prefer live testimony (so
he can cross-examine).
This isn't the case with most kinds of hearsay, including
co-conspirator

statements of

the

sort

involved here. 1

Part of

Technically, the Federal Rules of Evidence classify coconspirator statements as none
. Evid.
801 .(
e p rt1es
e no
1nvested any importance in
this fact, and properly so.
Like other out-of-court
statements that are treated as "hearsay" for Confrontation
Clause purposes, co-conspirator statements are out-ofcourt statements offered for their truth.
Cf. Tennessee
v. Street, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 2081 (1985)
(out-of-court
statements not offered as "substantive evidence" do not
(Footnote continued)

1

,.

the
other

evidentiary
kinds

value

of

of

admissible

which they are made.

co-conspirator,

statemen'ts--and

hearsay--stems

from

the

context

excited

standard hearsay exception:

utterance

in

The point is perhaps best seen by reference
iL

to another

most

is persuasive

\~

excited utterances.

An

evidence not simply because of

its content, but because the speaker was agitated, and therefore
not

likely

to

government's
utterance,

utter

a

evidence

calculated
in

a

falsehood.

criminal

case

If
was

part
an

of

the

excited

the government would not discard that evidence if the

declarant took the stand, because the declarant's live testimony
is not a substitute for
testimony,
the
sense

in other words, lacks the evidentiary significance of

out-of-court
to

"prefers"

The live

the out-of-court declaration.

tell

statement's

the

government

live testimony

It

context.
that

the

therefore

makes

Confrontation

to an excited utterance:

the

no

Clause
two are

not interchangeable pieces of evidence. 2
The defendant may,

of course,

wish

declarant about the out-of-court statement.

to cross-examine the
But the defendant is

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page)
raise Confrontation Clause concerns) .
I see no reason why
the Constitution should treat co-conspirator statements
differently because of their classification in the Federal ~
Rules.
2 The point applies as well to co-conspirator statements.
When the government offers the statement of one drug
( dealer to another in furtherance of a common (illegal)
scheme, the statement is likely to derive its significance
from the circumstances in which it was made. Conspirators
presumably speak differently when talking to each other in
furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on
the witness
stand.
Their motivation
in the former
circumstance may be an important corroborative tool for
evaluating their statements.

6.

and
Cbmpulsory

Process

make

effort

some

Clause
to

guarantees

obtain

the

the

that

witness'

Sixth
the

Amendment's

government

presence.

3

LaFa

Israel, Criminal Procedure §23. 3 (e) : see also Rovar io v.

u.s.

States, 353
do

under

rupra,

the

at

53 (1957).

(declarant

Un

That is all that the government

unavailability

75

will

requirement

found

anyway.

"unavailable"

See

because

Robe
she

traveling and could not be reached by phone).
The correctness of this analysis is confirmed by a look at
the

results

of

CA3's

decision.

approach,

the

government would have to produce the declarant if it could,

~

if neither

the

the government nor

declarant.

Under

the
have

government

would

only

testimony

is

substitute

a

Under

CA3's

the defendant wanted

approach
to

I've

produce

for

the

just

the

to question

outlined,

declarant

out-of-c~urt

if

the
live

declaration.

Otherwise, the defendant is free to invoke the court's processes

e

to obtain his presence.
I

have

two

analysis

affects

Clause

requires

trustworthiness.
since

unavailability

that

.
.
d eterm1nat1on

hearsay

Reliability

~

case,

Ro b erts'

CA3's

decision

prong

of

is

t h at

was

not

at

reached

~,

Roberts.

t he

in

the

admission

of

a

~~

Confronta ~

issue

in

this

on

the

approach

I've

solely
the

suggested is much more compatible with Dutton v. Evans, 400
74 (1970) than is CA3's approach.

this (f/"3

s~ia ~

have
simply

nothing

u.s.

In Dutton, the Court held that

co-conspirator

statement

(under

a

state

evidence rule different in some respects from the federal rule)

did

not

violate

the

defendant's

Confrontation

Clause

rights,

notwithstanding that the government did not show una'vailabili ty.
The

out-of-court

statement

in

Dutton

was

a

co-conspirator's

statement to a third party that "if it hadn't been for that dirty
son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans [the defendant], we wouldn't be in this
now."

u.s.,

400

at 77.

It seems clear that the defendant might

have cross-examined his co-conspirator about this statement, and
could conceivably have elicited some innocent explanation for the
statement. 3

But whether or not the declarant was called to the

witness stand,
evidence

because

expressly
joined

the out-of-court statement in Dutton was valuable
of

its

recognized.

by

the

Blackmun). 4

Chief

context,

u.s.,

400

Justice,

as

at

the

89

~ustice

(op.

Dutton
of

White,

plurality

Stewart,
and

J.,

Justice

Thus, there was no reason to condition its admission

on a showing that the declarant could not

giv~

live testimony.

Conclusion
The

Court

should

reverse

decision

in

r\

case. ('}vO
/~
Where an out-of-court statement and live testimony are fungible,
~~A~
'--------~

CA3 Is

this

~~

3 But see Roberts, supra, at 65 n. 7 (distinguishing
r:.utton
as
a
case
in which
"the utility of
trial
confrontation [was] so remote that [the Court] did not
require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available
witness").
1 concede that my analysis is in tension with
the language of Roberts' footnote 7.
4 The fifth and deciding vote in Dutton was Justice
Harlan, in whose view the Confrontation Clause did not in
any way limit the use of hearsay in criminal trials.
400
\\ u.s., at 94 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).

as

with

required

prior

recorded

to produce

testimony,

the

the live witness if

government
it can.

should

be

But where the

____________..,.____

out-of-court statement is offered not simply for its content but

,......_.__

also

for

the

context

in

which

it

was

made,

~
-----~--~----'-------~-------requirement
is senseless.
The defendant
subpoena

the

declarant

to

testify.

If

an

can,

unavailability
if

he

wishes,

the defendant does

not

subpoena the declarant, he has nothing to complain about when the
government offers the declaration.

'•
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1580

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH INADI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January - , 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the Confrontation
Clause requires the government to show that a non-testifying
co-conspirator is unavailable to testify, as a condition for admission of that co-conspirator's out-of-court statements.
I
Following a jury trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, respondent Joseph Inadi was convicted of conspiring to
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, and related
offenses. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment to
be followed by a seven-year parole term. The evidence at
·trial showed that in September 1979, respondent was approached by unindicted co-conspirator Michael McKeon, who
was seeking a distribution outlet for methamphetamine.
Respondent's role was to supply cash and chemicals for the
manufacture of methamphetamine and to be responsible for
its distribution. McKeon and another unindicted co-conspirator, William Levan, were to manufacture the substance.
In the course of manufacturing and selling methamphetamine, McKeon, Levan, and respondent met with another
unindicted co-conspirator, John Lazaro, at an empty house in
Cape May, New Jersey. There they extracted additional
methamphetamine from the liquid residue of previous
batches. In the early morning hours of May 23, 1980, two
Cape May police officers, pursuant to a warrant, secretly en-
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tered the house and removed a tray covered with drying
methamphetamine. With the permission of the issuing magistrate, the officers delayed returning an inventory, leaving
the participants to speculate over what had happened to the
missing tray.
On May 25, 1980, two DEA agents in Philadelphia monitored a meeting between respondent and Lazaro alongside
Lazaro's car. At one point one of the agents saw respondent
lean into the car. After Lazaro drove off, the agents
stopped his car. They searched the car, Lazaro, and a passenger, Marianne Lazaro, but they found nothing and let the
Lazaros leave. Marianne Lazaro later recounted that during
the search she threw away a clear plastic bag containing
white powder that her husband had handed to her after the
meeting with respondent. Eight hours after the search, one
of the agents returned to the scene of the crime and found a
clear plastic bag containing a small quantity of
methamphetamine.
From May 23 to May 27, 1980, the Cape May County Prosecutor's Office lawfully intercepted and recorded five telephone conversations between various participants in the conspiracy. These taped conversations were played for the jury
at trial. The conversations dealt with various aspects of the
conspiracy, including planned meetings and speculation about
who had taken the missing tray from the house and who had
set Lazaro up for the May 25 stop and search. Respondent
sought to exclude the recorded statements of Lazaro and the
other unindicted co-conspirators on the ground that the statements did not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), governing admission of co-conspirator
declarations. 1 After listening to the tapes the trial court admitted the statements, finding that they were made by con1

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not ·
hearsay if it is offered against a party and is "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
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spirators during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and thereby satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
Respondent also objected to admission of the statements
on Confrontation Clause grounds, contending that the statements were inadmissible absent a showing that the declarants were unavailable. The court suggested that the prosecutor bring Lazaro to court in order to demonstrate
unavailability. The court also asked defense counsel
whether she wanted the prosecution to call Lazaro as a witness, and defense counsel stated that she would discuss the
matter with her client. The co-conspirators' statements
were admitted, conditioned on the prosecution's commitment
to produce Lazaro. The government subpoenaed Lazaro,
but he failed to appear, claiming car trouble. The record
does not indicate that the defense made any effort on its own
part to secure Lazaro's presence in court.
Respondent renewed his Confrontation Clause objections,
arguing that the government had not met its burden of showing that Lazaro was unavailable to testify. The trial court
overruled the objection, ruling that Lazaro's statements
were admissible because they satisfied the co-conspirator
rule. 2
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The
court agreed that the government had satisfied Rule
801(d)(2)(E), but decided that the Confrontation Clause established an independent requirement that the government,
as a condition to admission of any out-of-court statements,
must show the unavailability of the declarant. United States
v. Inadi, 748 F. 2d 812, 818 (CA3 1984). The court derived
this "unavailability rule" from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56
(1980). The Court of Appeals rejected the government's
contention that Roberts did not require a showing of unavail2
The trial court also noted that two of the four co-conspirator declarants
(Mrs. Lazaro and McKeon) had testified and that a third (Levan) was unavailable because he had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege outside
the presence of the jury.
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ability as to a non-testifying co-conspirator, finding that Roberts created a "clear constitutional rule" applicable to out-ofcourt statements generally. 748 F. 2d, at 818. The court
found no reason to create a special exception for co-conspirator statements, and therefore ruled Lazaro's statements inadmissible. Inadi, supra, 818-819.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - , (1985) to resolve
the question whether the Confrontation Clause requires a
showing of unavailability as a condition to admission of the
out-of-court statements of a non-testifying co-conspirator,
when those statements otherwise satisfy the requirements of
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). 3 We now reverse.
II
A

The Court of Appeals derived its rule that the government
must demonstrate unavailability from our decision in Roberts. It quoted Roberts as holding that "in conformance with
the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth
Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual
case . . . the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against the defendant." 448 U. S., at 65. The
Court of Appeals viewed this language as setting forth a
"clear constitutional rule" applicable before any hearsay can
be admitted. 748 F. 2d, at 818. Under this interpretation
of Roberts, no out-of-court statement would be admissible
without a showing of unavailability.
Roberts, however, does not stand for such a wholesale revision of the law of evidence, nor does it support such a broad
The reliability of the out-of-court statements is not at issue in this
case. The Court of Appeals determined that whether or not the statements are reliable, their admission violated the Sixth Amendment because
the government did not show that the declarant was unavailable to testify.
748 F . 2d, at 818-819. The sole issue before the Court is whether that
decision is correct .
3

•Y
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interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. Roberts itself
disclaimed any intention of proposing a general answer to the
many difficult questions arising out of the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay. "The Court
has not sought to 'map out a theory of the Confrontation
. Clause that would determine the validity of all . . . hearsay
"exceptions.""' 448 U. S., at 65, quoting California v.
Green, 399 U. S. 149, 162 (1970). The Court in Roberts remained "[c]onvinced that 'no rule will perfectly resolve all
possible problems'" and rejected the "invitation to overrule a
near-century of jurisprudence" in order to create such a rule.
448 U. S., at 68 n. 9, quoting Natali, Green, Dutton, and
Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 RutgersCamden L. J. 43, 73 (1975). In addition, the Court specifically noted that a "demonstration of unavailability ... is not
always required." !d., at 65 n. 7. In light of these limiting
statements, Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer
to questions not presented in that case, but rather as a reso-·
lution of the issue the Court said it was examining: "the constitutional propriety of the introduction in evidence of the
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not produced at
the defendant's subsequent state criminal trial." ld., at 58. 4
The Confrontation Clause analysis in Roberts focuses on
those factors that come into play when the prosecution seeks
to admit testimony from a prior judicial proceeding in place of
live testimony at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). In
'Roberts involved a state criminal trial on charges of forging a check in
the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possession of stolen credit cards belonging to Issacs and his wife. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel
called the Isaacs' daughter as a witness. She testified that she had permitted the defendant to use the apartment for several days, but she refused to admit that she had given the defendant the checks or credit cards.
Between the preliminary hearing and the trial, through no fault of the
state, she disappeared. At trial, the defendant testified that the Isaac's
daughter had given him the checks and credit cards to use. The state
sought to offer the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony in rebuttal. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 58-60 (1980).

T , ... •
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particular, the Roberts Court examined the requirement,
found in a long line of Confrontation Clause cases involving
prior testimony, that before such statements can be admitted
the government must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972);
California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page,
390 U. S. 719 (1969); Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314
(1969). 5 All of the cases cited in Roberts for this "unavailability rule" concern prior testimony. In particular, the
Court focused on two cases, Barber and Mancusi, that directly "explored the issue of constitutional unavailability."
448 U. S., at 76. Both cases specifically limited the unavailability exception to prior testimony. Barber, supra, at 722;
Mancusi, supra, at 211.
Roberts must be read consistently with the question it answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts. All of these
indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule,
foreshadowed in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), established in Barber, and refined in a line of cases up through
Roberts, that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony. 6 Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical
proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced
by the government without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable.
B

There are good reasons why the unavailability rule, developed in cases involving former testimony, is not applicable to
co-conspirators' out-of-court statements. Unlike some other
5

Fed. R. Evid. 804 also imposes an unavailability requirement before
allowing the admission of prior testimony. The Rule 804 requirement is
part of the law of evidence regarding hearsay. While it "may readily be
conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values," California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 155
(1970), the overlap is not complete.
6
In federal court the unavailability rule for former trial testimony was
established long before Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), in Mattox v.
United States, 156 U. S. 237 (1895).
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exceptions to the hearsay rules, or the ·exemption from the
hearsay definition involved in this case, former testimony
often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It seldom has independent evidentiary significance of its own, but
is intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is
available and the same information can be presented to the
trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full crossexamination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the
declarant, there is little justification for relying on the
weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence
are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay,
applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the
better evidence. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another
One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 143 (1972). But if the declarant is
unavailable, no "better" version of the evidence exists, and
the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live
testimony on the same point.
Those same principles do not apply to co-conspirator statements. Because they are made while the conspiracy is in
progress, such statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant
testifies to the same matters in court. When the government-as here-offers the statement of one drug dealer to
another in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy, the statement
often will derive its significance from the circumstances in
which it was made. Conspirators are likely to speak
differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their
illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand.
Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements during the course of the
conspiracy.
In addition, the relative positions of the parties will have
changed substantially between the time of the statements
and the trial. The declarant and the defendant will have
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changed from partners in an illegal conspiracy to suspects or
defendants in a criminal trial, each with information potentially damaging to the other. The declarant himself may be
facing indictment or trial, in which case he has little incentive
to aid the prosecution, and yet will be equally wary of coming
to the aid of his former partners in crime. In that situation,
it is extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture
the evidentiary significance of statements made when the
conspiracy was operating in full force.
These points distinguish co-conspirators' statements from
the statements involved in Roberts and our other prior testimony cases. Those cases rested in part on the strong similarities between the prior judicial proceedings and the trial.
No such strong similarities exist between co-conspirator
statements and live testimony at trial. To the contrary, coconspirator statements derive much of their value from the
fact that they are made in a context very different from trial,
and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence. Under these circumstances, "only clear folly would
dictate an across the board policy of doing without" such
statements. Advisory Committee's Introductory Note on
the Hearsay Problem, quoted in Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1185, 1193 (1979). The admission of co-conspirators' declarations into evidence thus actually furthers the "Confrontation Clause's very mission" which
is to "advance 'the accuracy of the truth-determining process
in criminal trials."' Tennessee v. Street, 105 S. Ct. 2078,
2082 (1985), quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89
(1970).

c

There appears to be little, if any, benefit to be accomplished by the Court of Appeals' unavailability rule. First, if
the declarant either is unavailable, or is available and produced by the prosecution, the statements can be introduced
anyway. Thus, the unavailability rule cannot be defended as
a constitutional "better evidence" rule, because it does not
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actually serv'e to exclude anything, unless the prosecution
makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise available
witness. Cf. Westen, supra; Davenport, The Confrontation
Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378,
1403 (1972). In this case, for example, out-of-court statements by Michael McKeon and Marianne Lazaro, who testified under immunity, could be introduced based on their testimony in court. The statements of William Levan were
admissible because he properly asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and thereby was unavailable.
Second, an unavailability rule is not likely to produce much
testimony that adds anything to the "truth-determining process" over and above what would be produced without such a
rule. Dutton, supra, at 89. Some of the available declarants already will have been subpoenaed by the prosecution or
the defense, regardless of any Confrontation Clause requirements. Presumably only those declarants that neither side
believes will be particularly helpful will not have been subpoenaed as witnesses. There is much to indicate that Lazaro
was in that position in this case. Neither the government
nor the defense originally subpoenaed Lazaro as a witness. 7
When he subsequently failed to show, alleging car trouble,
respondent did nothing to secure his testimony. If respondent independently wanted to secure Lazaro's testimony, he
had several options available, particularly under Fed. R.
Evid. 806, 8 which provides that if the party against whom a
In fact, the actions of the parties in this case demonstrate what is no
doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy cases-neither side wants a coconspirator as a witness. As explained supra, at - , the interests of the
prosecution and the co-conspirator seldom will run together. Nor do the
co-conspirator's interests coincide with his former partners, since each is in
a position that is potentially harmful to the others.
8
Rule 806 states:
''When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2),
(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evi7
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co-conspirator statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, "the party is entitled to examine him on the
statement as if under cross-examination." Rule 806 would
not require respondent to make the showing necessary to
have Lazaro declared a hostile witness, although presumably
that option also was available to him. The Compulsory Process Clause would have aided respondent in obtaining the testimony of any of these declarants. 9 If the government has
no desire to call a co-conspirator declarant as a witness, and if
the defense has not chosen to subpoena such a declarant,
either as a witness favorable to the defense, or as a hostile
witness, or for cross-examination under Fed. R. Evid. 806, 10
then it is difficult to see what, if anything, is gained by a rule
that requires the prosecution to make that declarant
"available." 11
dence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. . . . If the party against whom a hearsay statement has
been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination."
9
U. S. Const. Amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... " Cf. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory
Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L.
Rev. 567, 586-601 (1978).
10
It is not clear from the Court of Appeals' opinion wheth5 in order to
meet its burden of showing unavailability, the prosecutiOJ)I would be required to call the declarant as a witness, or only to ensure that the declarant is available for testimony if needed. The unavailability rule suffers
from many of the same flaws under either interpretation, and in fact may
be even less defensible under an interpretation requiring the prosecution
to call each declarant as a witness.
11
In addition to the reasons mentioned in the text why an unavailability
rule would be of little value, many co-conspirator statements are not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and thus do not come
within the traditional definition of hearsay, even without the special exemption of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Thus, some of the out-of-court
statements in this case presumably could be admitted without implicating
the Confrontation Clause. For example, in one of the recorded phone conversations Levan and Lazaro discuss the missing tray with Lazaro sug-
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While the benefits seem slight, the burden imposed by the
Court of Appeals' unavailability rule is significant. A constitutional rule requiring a determination of availability
every time the prosecution seeks to introduce a co-conspirator's declaration automatically adds another avenue of appellate review in these complex cases. The co-conspirator
rule apparently is the most frequently used exception to the
hearsay rule. See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 427, at 331 (1980). 12 A rule that required each invocation of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to be accompanied by a decision on
the declarant's availability would impose a substantial burden
on the entire criminal justice system.
Moreover, an unavailability rule places a significant practical burden on the prosecution. In every case involving coconspirator statements, the prosecution would be required to
identify with specificity each declarant, locate those declarants, and then endeavor to ensure their continuing availability for trial. Where declarants are incarcerated there is the
burden on prison officials and marshals of transporting them
to and from the courthouse, as well as the increased risk of
escape. For unincarcerated declarants the unavailability
rule would require that during the sometimes lengthy period
before trial the government must endeavor to be aware of the
whereabouts of the declarant or run the risk of a court determination that its efforts to produce the declarant did not satgesting that "Mike" took it and speculating about who set Lazaro up for the
May 25 stop. Inadi, supra, 748 F. 2d at 815. Certainly these statements
were not introduced in order to prove the truth of the matters asserted,
but as background for the conspiracy, or to explain the significance of certain events. We explained just last Term that admission of non-hearsay
"raises no Confrontation Clause concerns." Tennessee v. Street, supra, at
2081. Cross-examination regarding such statements would contribute
nothing to Confrontation Clause interests.
12
Fed. R. Evid. 801 characterizes out-of-court statements by co-conspirators as exemptions from, rather than exceptions to, the hearsay rule.
Whether such statements are termed exemptions or exceptions is not relevant to Confrontation Clause analysis.
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isfy the test of "good faith." See Ohio v. Roberts, supra, at
74-77; id., at 77-82 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Ordonez, 737 F. 2d 793, 802 (CA9 1984). 13
An unavailability rule would impose all of these burdens
even if neither the prosecution nor the defense wished to examine the declarant at trial. Any marginal protection to the
defendant by forcing the government to call as witnesses
those co-conspirator declarants who are available, willing to
testify, hostile to the defense and yet not already subpoenaed
by the prosecution, when the defendant himself can call and
cross-examine such declarants, cannot support an unavailability rule. We hold today that the Confrontation Clause
does not embody such a rule.

III
To some degree, respondent's arguments in this case require us to revisit this Court's resolution of this question in
Dutton, supra, 400 U. S. 74 (1970). Although Dutton involved a state co-conspirator rule instead of Fed. -R. Evid.
801, the state rule actually admitted a broader category of coconspirator statements. Nevertheless, a plurality of this
Court found that the rule did not violate the Confrontation
Clause and a fifth member of the Court, Justice Harlan, reasoned that the Confrontation Clause was not applicable at all.
In Dutton the Court stated that "we do not question the validity of the co-conspirator exception applied in the federal
courts." Dutton, supra, at 80. Upon closer examination
today, we continue to affirm the validity of the use of co-conspirator statements, and we decline to require a showing of
the declarant's unavailability as a prerequisite to their
admission.
18
The court in Ordonez, supra, found a Confrontation Clause violation
because the government, after introducing drug ledgers containing entries
made by unidentified co-conspirators, did not adequately demonstrate that
it was totally unable to identify those conspirators.

•·
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We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1580

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH INADI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[February - , 1986]

JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
With respect to the case before us, the majority takes but a
small step. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), the
Court held: "When a hearsay decladnt is not present for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally
requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only it it bears adequate 'indicia of
reliability."' ld., at 66 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S.
74, 89 (1970) (plurality opinion)). The majority now assures
us that "[t]he reliability of the out-of-court statements is not
at issue in this case." Ante, at--, n. 3. Respondent is
thus free to return to the Court of Appeals and argue that the
co-conspirator declarations admitted against him lack the "indicia of reliability'' demanded by the Confrontation Clause. 1
Today's decision does nothing to resolve the conflict among the lower
courts as to whether declarations of co-conspirators who are not present in
court for cross-examiniation must be shown to have particularized "indicia
of reliability'' before they can be admitted for substantive purposes against
a criminal defendant. Compare United States v. DeLuna, 763 F. 2d 897
(CAB 1985) (particularized inquiry into reliability of co-conspirator statements demanded in addition to unavailability requirement); United States
v. Ordonez, 722 F. 2d 530, 535 (CA9 1983) (particularized assessment of
reliability needed for every statement admitted under co-conspirator hearsay exemption); United States v. Perez, 702 F. 2d 33 (CA2) (same), cert.
denied, 462 U. S. 1108 (1983), with Boone v. Marshall, 760 F. 2d 117, 119
(CA6 1985) (declaration admitted under co-conspirator exemption "automatically satisfies the Sixth Amendment's requirements"); United States
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With respect to its constitutional analysis, however, the
majority makes a giant leap. Even while conceding that the
"very mission" of the Confrontation Clause is to "'advance
"the accuracy of the truth determining process in criminal trials,""' id., at--, the Court today holds that the Clause is
not offended when the prosecution fails to make even the
slightest effort to produce for cross-examination the authors
of the out-of-court statements with which it hopes to convict
a defendant. Because I cannot share the majority's implicit
faith that the camaraderie of a criminal conspiracy can substi- 'JttJt,
tute for in-court cross-examination to guarantee the reliabil- x;ity of conspiratorial statements, I can neither accept the majority's analysis nor stand silent while the values embodied in
the Sixth Amendment are so cavalierly subordinated to prosecutorial efficiency.
I
A
In Ohio v. Roberts, supra, after canvassing the many previous cases that had examined the relationship between the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the many
exceptions to the hearsay rule, the Court noted:
"The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate
ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First,
in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-toface accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule
of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where
prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution
must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability
of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use
against the defendant. . . .
v. Molt, 758 F. 2d 1198 (CA7 1985) (same); Ottomano v. United States, 468
F. 2d 269, 273 (CA11972) (same), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1128 (1973). See
Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and
Hearsay, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 323, 361-362, and nn. 131-132 (1984).

{
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"The second aspect operates once a witness is shown
to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to
augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring
the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked
with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.'" I d., at 66
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 107
(1934)).
This sweeping language was in no way limited to any particular variety of out-of-court declarations, and the Third Circuit panel that the Court reverses today was hardly alone in
believing the rule in Roberts to be applicable to all such declarations. See, e. g., United States v. Massa, 740 F. 2d 629,
639 (CAB 1984); Haggins v. Warden, 715 F. 2d 1050, 1055
(CA6 1983), cert denied, 464 U. S. 1071 (1984); see also
United States v. Caputo, 758 F. 2d 944, 950, n. 2 (CA3 1985)
(collecting cases). The majority, however, now tells us that
Roberts "simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule ... that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony." Ante, at
- - . This effort to confine Roberts misconstrues both the
meaning of that decision and the essential command of the
Confrontation Clause.
Contrary to the majority's suggestion, it is clear that the
Roberts Court consciously sought to lay down an analytical
framework applicable to all out-of-court declarations introduced by the prosecution for the truth they contain. JusTICE BLACKMUN, writing for the Court, introduced his affirmation of the Confrontation Clause's twin requirements of
unavailability and reliability by noting: "The Court has not
sought to 'map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that
would determine the validity of all . . . hearsay "exceptions."' California v. Green, 399 U. S. [149,] 162 [1970].
But a general approach to the problem is discernible." 448
U. S., at 64-65. For its general principles, the Roberts
Court of course turned to a number of cases involving former

i
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testimony, e. g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972);
Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 (1968); Motes v. United States,
178 U. S. 458 (1900); California v. Green, supra, (all cited at
448 U. S., at 65). But it also relied on Dutton v. Evans,
supra (cited at 448 U. S., at 65, n. 7, and 66), where the
hearsay had been admitted pursuant to the Georgia co-conspirator exception, and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415
(1965) (cited at 448 U. S., at 63), which involved an accomplice's confession. Indeed, it was on Douglas that Roberts
relied for the proposition "that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and
that a 'primary interest served by [the provision] is the right
of cross-examination."' 448 U. S., at 63 (quoting Douglas,
supra, at 418).
The absence of any language in Roberts confining its analysis to prior testimony is not surprising. The Court simply
recognized that whenever the prosecution seeks to convict a
defendant by relying on the truth asserted in out-of-court
declarations, confrontation and cross-examination of the declarant in open court are the most trusted guarantors of the
reliability that is the primary concern of the Confrontation
Clause. The need for these guarantors is as critical in cases
involving the extrajudicial statements of co-conspirators as it
is in cases involving the prior testimony of an absent declarant or the confession of an accomplice.
B

When the prosecution introduces the statements of a coconspirator merely to show what the declarant might have
been thinking or what he wished his listeners to believe at
the time he spoke, neither the rule against hearsay nor the
Confrontation Clause is implicated by their admission against
a defendant. See Tennessee v. Street, supra. However,
when the prosecution invokes the co-conspirator exemption
to the hearsay rule, as it does in this case, it is urging the
truth of the matters asserted in the extrajudicial statements.
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The question here must be whether we have so much confidence in the factual accuracy of statements made by conspirators in furtherance of their conspiracy that we deem the
testing of these statements by cross-examination unnecessary to guarantee the reliability of a trial's result.
The majority is quite right to suggest that "[c]onspirators
are likely to speak differently when talking to each other in
furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on the
witness stand." Ante, at--. However, the differences
between an accomplice's conspiratorial utterances and his
testimony in court are not merely those of diction and demeanor. That a statement was truly made "in furtherance"
of a conspiracy cannot possibly be a guarantee, or even an indicium, of its reliability. See Davenport, The Confrontation
Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378,
1384-1391 (1972); Note, Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) and the Confrontation Clause: Closing the Window of Admissibility for Coconspirator Hearsay, 53 Fordham
L. Rev. 1291, 1311-1312 (1985). As one commentator has
noted:
"Conspirators' declarations are good to prove that some
conspiracy exists but less trustworthy to show its aims
and membership. The conspirator's interest is likely to
lie in misleading the listener into believing the conspiracy stronger with more members (and different members) and other aims than in fact it has. It is no victory
for common sense to make a belief that criminals are
noted for their veracity the basis for law." Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1159, 1165-1166
(1954).
The unreliability of co-conspirator declarations as trial evidence is not merely a product of the duplicity with which
criminals often conduct their business. It also stems from
the ambiguities that so often appear in all casual conversations, not just those of outlaws. See, e. g., Dutton v. Evans,

'J
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at 104 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). And the difficulties one
has in making sense of slang and dialect can be compounded
where conspirators use private codes, as indeed they did in
this case. Because of these problems, trained case agents
are often hard pressed to piece together the facts of a crimi'
nal conspiracy from the confused tangle of conversations
they
have intercepted.
The appearance of a co-conspirator declarant in court will allow the elimination of ambiguity that
neither side has a right to profit from.

c
Consideration of the reasons why co-conspirator declarations have been exempted from the rule against hearsay only
confirms doubts as to the reliability of the truth asserted in
those statements. In contrast to other types of statements
excepted from the rule, the co-conspirator declarations have
not been admitted because of a belief in their special reliability. See Davenport, supra, at 1384-1385; Levie, supra, at
1161-1167. Rather, the root of the exemption lies in substantive law. Under the agency theory that supports conspiracy law, "once the conspiracy or combination is established, the act of one conspirator, in the prosecution of the
enterprise, is considered the act of all, and is evidence
against all." United States v. Gooding, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.)
460, 469 (1827). Every statement of co-conspirators in furtherance of their illegal scheme is thus a verbal act admissible
against each conspirator as if it had been his own.
This agency theory, which even the Advisory Committee
on the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence labelled "at best a
fiction," Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note,
might justify the exemption conferred upon co-conspirator
declarations from the traditional rule against hearsay. But
it speaks not at all to the Confrontation Clause's concern for
reliable factfinding.

I,,

84-1580--DISSENT
UNITED STATES v. INADI

7

II

Without even attempting to argue that co-conspirator declarations have an inherent reliability that might justify their
admission at trial when the declarant is not present in court
for cross-examination, the majority instead supports its holding by arguing that "it is extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture the evidentiary significance of statements made when the conspiracy was operating in full force."
Ante, at - -. Indeed, the Court asserts, "co-conspirator
statements derive much of their value from the fact that they
are made in a context very different from trial, and therefore
are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence." Ibid.
I truly cannot understand the majority's fear that a rule requiring the prosecution to do its best to produce a co-conspirator declarant in court would somehow deprive triers of fact
of valuable evidence. Under this rule, if the prosecution
could not in all good faith produce the declarant, the extrajudicial statements could come in, so long as they could be
shown to have "adequate 'indicia of reliability,"' Roberts,
supra, at 66. The majority's fear must therefore stem from
a notion that if the prosecution is able to produce the declarant in court, his presence will somehow prevent the jury from
hearing the truth. This conclusion overlooks the critical importance of cross-examination in the truth-seeking process.
If a declarant takes the stand, his out-of-court statements
will still be admitted as evidence, so long as they are sufficiently reliable and there are no other grounds for their exclusion. And cross-examination will only enhance their
value to the jury. The defendant will have a chance to inquire into the circumstances under which the statements
were made and the motives that might have led the declarant
to color their truth at the time. Cross-examination also may
force the declarant to clarify ambiguous phrases and coded
references. If anything he says is inconsistent with his prior
statement, the declarant will no doubt advance some explanation for the inaccuracy of the extrajudicial statement-"an
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explanation a jury may be expected to understand and take
into account in deciding which, if either, of the statements
represents the truth," California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149,
159 (1970). Cf. Nelson v. O'Neil 402 U. S. 622, 627-629
(1971).

Whether or not a co-conspirator produced in court affirms,
denies, or qualifies the truth of his out-of-court statement,
his presence will contribute to the accuracy of the factfinding
enterprise, the accuracy that is the primary concern of the
Confrontation Clause. Whatever truth is contained in his
extrajudicial declarations cannot be lost. It can only be supplemented by additional information of no ·less use to the
triers of fact.
III
Recognizing that there may well be cases in which the
cross-examination of a co-conspirator declarant is
indispensible to a defendant's case, the Court reminds us that
a defendant can always exercise his rights under the Compulsory Process Clause and call the declarant as his own witness. As long as this option remains open to a defendant,
the Court reasons, "it is difficult to see what, if anything, is
gained by a rule that requires the prosecution to make that
declarant 'available."' Ante, at--. However, even assuming, as the Court seems to do, that the "good faith standard governing the state's obligation to produce defense witnesses [pursuant to the Compulsory Process Clause] is
precisely the same one that governs the state's obligation to
confront a defendant with the witnesses against him [pursuant to the Confrontation Clause]," Westen, Confrontation
and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 588 (1978), this is not
a satisfactory response to respondent's Confrontation Clause
claim.
The short answer to the majority's argument is that the
Confrontation Clause gives a defendant a right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, not merely an oppor-
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tunity to seek out witnesses on his own. As one court once
noted of a situation similar to that presented in this case:
"That [a co-conspirator declarant] was available to be
called as a witness does not mitigate the prosecution's
misconduct here. The State sought to shift to the defendant the risk of calling [the declarant] to the stand.
To accept the State's argument that the availability of
[the declarant] is the equivalent of putting him on the
stand and subjecting him to cross-examination would severely alter the presumptions of innocence and the burdens of proof which protect the accused." Hoover v.
Beto, 439 F. 2d 913, 924 (CA5 1971) (Wisdom, J.), rev'd
on rehearing en bane, 467 F . 2d 516 (CA5)(over dissent
of seven judges), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1086 (1972).
See also Dutton v. Evans, supra, at 104 (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting).
The disadvantages that the majority would impose upon a
defendant are not merely theoretical. The Court notes the
"significant practical burden" placed on the prosecution by a
requirement that the government identify co-conspirator declarants with specificity. Ante, at--. As an illustration
of the difficulties that the prosecution would be forced to
face, the majority refers to United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.
2d 793 (CA9 1984), where the court found a Confrontation
Clause violation in the government's failure to identify the individuals who had made the entries in the "drug ledgers" introduced as evidence against the defendant. Ante, at--,
n. 13. However, the Court now places this "significant practical burden" upon the defendant, who may well be in no better a position to make such identifications. Even were it
proper· to assume the defendant's guilt and impute to him
knowledge regarding pending charges, it can hardly be
claimed that a defendant who has played but a minor role in a
complex conspiracy necessarily has an intimate knowledge of

•I

•

·t

84-1580-DISSENT

·.I

10

UNITED STATES v. INADI

the names and activities of his alleged co-conspirators. 2
"The prosecution therefore [should have] the burden of producing and calling to the witness stand the persons whose
out-of-court statements it uses against the accused because,
as between the two sides, the prosecution is in a better position to identify them and to initiate their production at that
time." Westen, supra, at 616.
Even when a defendant is in as good a position as the prosecution to subpoena available declarants, a rule requiring him
to call those declarants as his own witnesses may deny the
defendant certain tactical advantages vouchsafed him by the
Confrontation Clause. Under the regime established today,
the only cross-examination that will attend the prosecution's
introduction of co-conspirator declarations will be of whoever
heard or recorded those statements and will focus merely on
whether or not the statements were actually made. Any inquiry into the reliability of the statements must await the defendant's case. But if the defendant chooses to call the declarant as a defense witness, defendant risks bolstering in the
jury's eyes the very conspiracy allegations he wishes to rebut. That the witness is viewed as hostile by the defendant,
and has possibly been certified as such by the trial judge,
does not necessarily mean that his relationship to the defendant will be so perceived by the jury, unless defense counsel
chooses to dramatize the antagonism with hyperbole that
might lose him the sympathy of the jury.
Moreover, even the harshest grilling of a declarant by the
defense can occur only after the prosecution has rested its
case. In a complex conspiracy trial, the time elapsing between the introduction of the hearsay and the cross-examination of the declarant may be quite substantial. During this
time, the declarations will be unrebutted in jurors' minds.
And their effect may actually be enhanced should either the
2
I realize that this was not the case here. However, the Court's holding addresses all cases involving co-conspirator declarations and thus extends to all the hypotheticals I discuss.
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defense or prosecution repeat the statements in the course of
examining the declarant. In short, "[o]nly a lawyer without
trial experience would suggest that the limited right to impeach one's own witness is the equivalent of that right to immediate cross-examination which has always been regarded
as the greatest safeguard of American trial procedure."
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F. 2d 297, 305 (CADC
1945); see United States v. Oates, 560 F. 2d 45, 82, n. 39
(CA2 1977).
In federal prosecutions, there is an additional drawback.
When a defendant calls a declarant as his own witness, he has
no statutory right to obtain any prior statements of that declarant in the government's possession-a right that attaches
only "[a]fter a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination," 18 U. S. C. § 3500.
In view of all the disadvantages that attend a defendant's
decision to call a co-conspirator declarant as a witness, the
majority's reliance on the defendant's right to compulsory
process to justify a decision to deprive him of a critical aspect
of his Confrontation Clause right cannot be supported. The
two are simply not equivalent. Moreover, the majority's belief that an unavailability requirement would contribute nothing but a cast of unwanted supernumeraries has no basis in
the realities of criminal prosecutions. There might be instances in which an available declarant is of so little value to
either side that calling him as a witness would truly be an unnecessary exercise. See, e. g., Anderson v. United States,
417 U. S. 211, 220, n. 11 (1974). But a defendant's failure to
call a declarant as his own witness can in no way be taken as
proof that such is the case.
IV
At bottom, today's decision rests upon the Court's judgment that a defendant's constitutional interest in subjecting
the extrajudicial declarations of co-conspirators to the crossexamination that has traditionally been the primary guaran-
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tee of reliability in trials must be subordinated to considerations of prosecutorial efficiency. I do .not believe the
concerns of the Confrontation Clause should be so easily disregarded. The plight of Sir Walter Raleigh, condemned on
the deposition of an alleged accomplice who had since recanted, may have loomed large in the eyes of those who
drafted that constitutional guarantee. See F. Heller, The
Sixth Amendment 104 (1951); Stephen, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th
But the Framers, had they the preser., vol. 2, 172 (1919).
science, would surely have been as apprehensive of the spectacle of a defendant's conviction upon the testimony of a
handful of surveillance technicians and a very large box of
tapes recording the boasts, faulty recollections, and coded or
ambiguous utterances of outlaws. The Court's decision
helps clear the way for this spectacle to become a common occurrence. I dissent.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1580

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH INADI
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[March-, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the Confrontation
Clause requires the Government to show that a nontestifying
co-conspirator is unavailable to testify, as a condition for
admission of that co-conspirator's out-of-court statements.
I
Following a jury trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, respondent Joseph Inadi was convicted of conspiring to
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, and related
offenses. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment to
be followed by a 7-year parole term. The evidence at trial
showed that in September 1979, respondent was approached
by unindicted co-conspirator Michael McKeon, who was seeking a distribution outlet for methamphetamine. Respondent's role was to supply cash and chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine and to be responsible for its
distribution. McKeon and another unindicted co-conspirator, William Levan, were to manufacture the substance.
In the course of manufacturing and selling methamphetamine, McKeon, Levan, and respondent met with another
unindicted co-conspirator, John Lazaro, at an empty house in
Cape May, New Jersey. There they extracted additional
methamphetamine from the liquid residue of previous
batches. In the early morning hours of May 23, 1980, two
Cape May police officers, pursuant to a warrant, secretly en-
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tered the house and removed a tray covered with drying
methamphetamine. With the permission of the issuing Magistrate, the officers delayed returning an inventory, leaving
the participants to speculate over what had happened to the
missing tray.
On May 25, 1980, two DEA agents in Philadelphia monitored a meeting between respondent and Lazaro alongside
Lazaro's car. At one point one of the agents saw respondent
lean into the car. After Lazaro drove off, the agents
stopped his car. They searched the car, Lazaro, and a passenger, Marianne Lazaro, but they found nothing and let the
Lazaros leave. Marianne Lazaro later recounted that during
the search she threw away a clear plastic bag containing
white powder that her husband had handed to her after the
meeting with respondent. Eight hours after the search, one
of the agents returned to the scene of the crime and found a
clear plastic bag containing a small quantity of methamphetamine.
From May 23 to May 27, 1980, the Cape May County Prosecutor's Office lawful~~p~d and recorded five telephone conversations between various participants in the conspiracy. These taped conversations were played for the jury
at trial. The conversations dealt with various aspects of the
conspiracy, including planned meetings and speculation about
who had taken the missing tray from the house and who had
set Lazaro up for the May 25 stop and search. Respondent
sought to exclude the recorded statements of Lazaro and the
other unindicted co-conspirators on the ground that the statements did not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), governing admission of co-conspirator
declarations.' After listening to the tapes the trial court admitted the statements, finding that they were made by con1
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not
hearsay if it is offered against a party and is "a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
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spirators during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and thereby satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
Respondent also objected to admission of the statements
on Confrontation Clause grounds, contending that the statements were inadmissible absent a showing that the declarants were unavailable. The court suggested that the prosecutor bring Lazaro to court in order to demonstrate
unavailability.
The court also asked defense counsel
whether she wanted the prosecution to call Lazaro as a witness, and defense counsel stated that she would discuss the
matter with her client. The co-conspirators' statements
were admitted, conditioned on the prosecution's commitment
to produce Lazaro. The Government subpoenaed Lazaro,
but he failed to appear, claiming car trouble. The record
does not indicate that the defense made any effort on its own
part to secure Lazaro's presence in court.
Respondent renewed his Confrontation Clause objections,
arguing that the Government had not met its burden of showing that Lazaro was unavailable to testify. The trial court
overruled the objection, ruling that Lazaro's statements
were admissible because they satisfied the co-conspirator
rule. 2
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. The
court agreed that the Government had satisfied Rule
801(d)(2)(E), but decided that the Confrontation Clause established an independent requirement that the Government,
as a condition to admission of any out-of-court statements,
must show the unavailability of the declarant. United States
v. Inadi, 748 F. 2d 812, 818 (CA3 1984). The court derived
this "unavailability rule" from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56
(1980). The Court of Appeals rejected the Government's
contention that Roberts did not require a showing of una vail' The trial court also noted that two of the four co-conspirator declarants
(Mrs. Lazaro and McKeon) had testified and that a third (Levan) was unavailable because he had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege outside
the presence of the jury.
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ability as to a nontestifying co-conspirator, finding that Roberts created a "clear constitutional rule" applicable to out-ofcourt statements generally. 748 F. 2d, at 818. The court
found no reason to create a special exception for co-conspirator statements, and therefore ruled Lazaro's statements inadmissible. !d., at 818-819.
We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. - - (1985), to resolve the
question whether the Confrontation Clause requires a showing of unavailability as a condition to admission of the out-ofcourt statements of a nontestifying co-conspirator, when
those statements otherwise satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). 3 We now reverse.
II

A
The Court of Appeals derived its rule that the Government
must demonstrate unavailability from our decision in Roberts. It quoted Roberts as holding that "in conformance with
the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth
Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual
case ... the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against the defendant." 448 U. S., at 65. The
Court of Appeals viewed this language as setting forth a
"clear constitutional rule" applicable before any hearsay can
be admitted. 748 F. 2d, at 818. Under this interpretation
of Roberts, no out-of-court statement would be admissible
without a showing of unavailability.
Roberts, however, does not stand for such a wholesale revision of the law of evidence, nor does it support such a broad
The reliability of the out-of-court statements is not at issue in this
case. The Court of Appeals determined that whether or not the statements are reliable, their admission violated the Sixth Amendment because
the government did not show that the declarant was unavailable to testify.
748 F . 2d, at 818-819. The sole issue before the Court is whether that
decision is correct.
3
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interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. Roberts itself
disclaimed any intention of proposing a general answer to the
many difficult questions arising out of the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay. "The Court
has not sought to 'map out a theory of the Confrontation
Clause that would determine the validity of all . . . hearsay
"exceptions."'" 448 U. S., at 64-65, quoting California v.
Green , 399 U. S. 149, 162 (1970). The Court in Roberts remained "[c]onvinced that 'no rule will perfectly resolve all
possible problems'" and rejected the "invitation to overrule a
near-century of jurisprudence" in order to create such a rule.
448 U. S., at 68, n. 9, quoting Natali, Green, Dutton, and
Chambers: Three Cases in Search of .a Theory, 7 RutgersCamden L. J. 43, 73 (1975). In addition, the Court specifically noted that a "demonstration of unavailability ... is not
always required." 448 U. S., at 65, n. 7. In light of these
limiting statements, Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to questions not presented in that case, but
rather as a resolution of the issue the Court said it was examining: "the constitutional propriety of the introduction in evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not
produced at the defendant's subsequent state criminal trial."
ld., at 58. 4
The Confrontation Clause analysis in Roberts focuses on
those factors that come into play when the prosecution seeks
to admit testimony from a prior judicial proceeding in place of
'Roberts involved a state criminal trial on charges of forging a check in
the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possession of stolen credit cards belonging to Issacs and his wife. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel
called the Isaacs' daughter as a witness. She testified that she had permitted the defendant to use the apartment for several days, but she refused to admit that she had given the defendant the checks or credit cards.
Between the preliminary hearing and the trial, through no fault of the
State, she disappeared. At trial, the defendant testified that the Isaac's
daughter had given him the checks and credit cards to use. The State
sought to offer the transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony in rebuttal. 448 U. S., at 58-60.
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live testimony at trial. See Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(1). In
particular, the Roberts Court examined the requirement,
found in a long line of Confrontation Clause cases involving
prior testimony, that before such statements can be admitted
the government must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (1972);
California v. Green, supra; Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719
(1968); Berger v. California, 393 U. S. 314 (1969). 5 All of
the cases cited in Roberts for this "unavailability rule" concern prior testimony. In particular, the Court focused on
two cases, Barber and Mancusi, that directly "explored the
issue of constitutional unavailability." 448 U. S. , at 76.
Both cases specifically limited the unavailability exception to
prior testimony. Barber, supra, at 722; Mancusi, supra,
at 211.
Roberts must be r'ead consistently with the question it answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts. All of these
indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a longstanding rule ,
foreshadowed in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965), established in Barber, and refined in a line of cases up through
Roberts, that applies unavailability analysis to prior testimony. 6 Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical
proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced
by the government without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable.
B
There are good reasons why the unavailability rule , developed in cases involving former testimony, is not applicable to
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 also imposes an unavailability requirement before allowing the admission of prior testimony. The Rule 804 requirement is part of the law of evidence regarding hearsay. While it "may
readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are
generally designed to protect similar values ," California v. Green , 399
U. S. , at 155, the overlap is not complete.
6
In federal court the unavailability rule for former trial testimony was
established long before Pointer v. Texas , 380 U. S. 400 (1965), in Mattox v.
United States, 156 U. S. 237 (1895).
5
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co-conspirators' out-of-court statements. Unlike some other
exceptions to the hearsay rules, or the exemption from the
hearsay definition involved in this case, former testimony
often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It seldom has independent evidentiary significance of its own, but
is intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is
available and the same information can be presented to the
trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full crossexamination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the
declarant, there is little justification for relying on the
weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence
are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay,
applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the
better evidence. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another
One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 143 (1972). But if the declarant is
unavailable, no "better" version of the evidence exists, and
the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live
testimony on the same point.
Those same principles do not apply to co-conspirator statements. Because they are made while the conspiracy is in
progress, such statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, even if the declarant
testifies to the same matters in court. When the Government-as here-offers the statement of one drug dealer to
another in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy, the statement
often will derive its significance from the circumstances in
which it was made. Conspirators are likely to speak
differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their
illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand.
Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements during the course of the
conspiracy.
In addition, the relative positions of the parties will have
changed substantially between the time of the statements
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and the trial. The declarant and the defendant will have
changed from partners in an illegal conspiracy to suspects or
defendants in a criminal trial, each with information potentially damaging to the other. The declarant himself may be
facing indictment or trial, in which case he has little incentive
to aid the prosecution, and yet will be equally wary of coming
to the aid of his former partners in crime. In that situation,
it is extremely unlikely that in-court testimony will recapture
the evidentiary significance of statements made when the
conspiracy was operating in full force.
These points distinguish co-conspirators' statements from
the statements involved in Roberts and our other prior testimony cases. Those cases rested in part on the strong similarities between the prior judicial proceedings and the trial.
No such strong similarities exist between co-conspirator
statements and live testimony at trial. To the contrary, coconspirator statements derive much of their value from the
fact that they are made in a context very different from trial,
and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence. Under these circumstances, "only clear folly would
dictate an across the board policy of doing without" such
statements. Advisory Committee's Introductory Note on
the Hearsay Problem, quoted in Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1185, 1193 (1979). The admission of co-conspirators' declarations into evidence thus actually furthers the "Confrontation Clause's very mission" which
is to "advance 'the accuracy of the truth-determining process
in criminal trials."' Tennessee v. Street, 471 U. S. - - ,
- - (1985), quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89
(1970).

c

There appears to be little, if any, benefit to be accomplished by the Court of Appeals' unavailability rule. First, if
the declarant either is unavailable, or is available and produced by the prosecution, the statements can be introduced
anyway. Thus, the unavailability rule cannot be defended as
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a constitutional "better evidence" rule, because it does not
actually serve to exclude anything, unless the prosecution
makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise available
witness. Cf. Westen, supra; Davenport, The Confrontation
Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378, 1403
(1972). In this case, for example, out-of-court statements by
Michael McKeon and Marianne Lazaro, who testified under
immunity, could be introduced based on their testimony in
court. The statements of William Levan were admissible
because. he properly asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege
and thereby was unavailable.
Second, an unavailability rule is not likely to produce much
testimony that adds anything to the "truth-determining process" over and above what would be produced without such a
rule. Dutton, supra, at 89. Some of the available declarants already will have been subpoenaed by the prosecution or
the defense, regardless of any Confrontation Clause requirements. Presumably only those declarants that neither side
believes will be particularly helpful will not have been subpoenaed as witnesses. There is much to indicate that Lazaro
was in that position in this case. Neither the Government
nor the defense originally subpoenaed Lazaro as a witness. 7
When he subsequently failed to show, alleging car trouble,
respondent did nothing to secure his testimony. If respondent independently wanted to secure Lazaro's testimony, he
had several options available, particularly under Federal
Rule of Evidence 806, 8 which provides that if the party
7
In fact, the actions of the parties in this case demonstrate what is no
doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy cases-neither side wants a coconspirator as a witness. As explained supra, a t - , the interests of the
prosecution and the co-conspirator seldom will run together. Nor do the
co-conspirator's interests coincide with his former partners, since each is in
a position that is potentially harmful to the others.
8
Rule 806 states:
"When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2),
(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the

.. ,
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against whom a co-conspirator statement has been admitted
calls the declarant as a witness, "the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination."
Rule 806 would not require respondent to make the showing
necessary to have Lazaro declared a hostile witness, although
presumably that option also was available to him. The Compulsory Process Clause would have aided respondent in obtaining the testimony of any of these declarants. 9 If the
Government has no desire to call a co-conspirator declarant
as a witness, and if the defense has not chosen to subpoena
such a declarant, either as a witness favorable to the defense,
or as a hostile witness, or for cross-examination under Federal Rule of Evidence 806, 10 then it is difficult to see what, if
anything, is gained by a rule that requires the prosecution to
make that declarant "available." 11
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. . . . If the party against whom a hearsay statement has
been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination."
9
U. S. Const., Arndt. 6: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor .... " Cf. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A
Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567,
586-601 (1978).
''' It is not clear from the Court of Appeals' opinion whether in order to
meet its burden of showing unavailability, the prosecution, would be required to call the declarant as a witness, or only to ensure that the declarant is available for testimony if needed. The unavailability rule suffers
from many of the same flaws under either interpretation, and in fact may
be even less defensible under an interpretation requiring the prosecution
to call each declarant as a witness.
"In addition to the reasons mentioned in the text why an unavailability
rule would be of little value, many co-conspirator statements are not introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and thus do not come
within the traditional definition of hearsay, even without the special exemption of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Thus, some of the outof-court statements in this case presumably could be admitted without implicating the Confrontation Clause. For example, in one of the recorded

••• t' •.
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While the benefits seem slight, the burden imposed by the
Court of Appeals' unavailability rule is significant. A constitutional rule requiring a determination of availability
every time the prosecution seeks to introduce a co-conspirator's declaration automatically adds another avenue of appellate review in these complex cases. The co-conspirator
rule apparently is the most frequently used exception to the
hearsay rule. See 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 427, p. 331 (1980). 12 A rule that required each invocation of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) to be accompanied by a decision on
the declarant's availability would impose a substantial burden
on the entire criminal justice system.
Moreover, an unavailability rule places a significant practical burden on the prosecution. In every case involving coconspirator statements, the prosecution would be required to
identify with specificity each declarant, locate those declarants, and then endeavor to ensure their continuing availability for trial. Where declarants are incarcerated there is the
burden on prison officials and marshals of transporting them
to and from the courthouse, as well as the increased risk of
escape. For unincarcerated declarants the unavailability
rule would require that during the sometimes lengthy period
before trial the Government must endeavor to be aware of
the whereabouts of the declarant or run the risk of a court
phone conversations Levan and Lazaro discuss the missing tray with
Lazaro suggesting that "Mike" took it and speculating about who set
Lazaro up for the May 25 stop. 748 F. 2d , at 815. Certainly these statements were not introduced in order to prove the truth of the matters asserted, but as background for the conspiracy, or to explain the significance
of certain events. We explained just last Term that admission of nonhearsay "raises no Confrontation Clause concerns." Tennessee v. Street,
471 U. S. - - , - - (1985). Cross-examination regarding such statements would contribute nothing to Confrontation Clause interests.
12
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 characterizes out-of-court statements by
co-conspirators as exemptions from, rather than exceptions to, the hearsay
rule. Whether such statements are termed exemptions or exceptions, the
same Confrontation Clause principles apply.

!o'
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determination that its efforts to produce the declarant did not
satisfy the test of "good faith." See Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U. S., at 74-77; id. , at 77-82 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); see
also United States v. Ordonez, 737 F. 2d 793, 802 (CA9
1984). 13
An unavailability rule would impose all of these burdens
even if neither the prosecution nor the defense wished to examine the declarant at trial. Any marginal protection to the
defendant by forcing the government to call as witnesses
those co-conspirator declarants who are available, willing to
testify, hostile to the defense and yet not already subpoenaed
by the prosecution, when the defendant himself can call and
cross-examine such declarants, cannot support an unavailability rule. We hold today that the Confrontation Clause
does not embody such a rule.

III
To some degree, respondent's arguments in this case require us to revisit this Court's resolution of this question in
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74 (1970). Although Dutton involved a state co-conspirator rule instead of Federal Rule of
Evidence 801, the state rule actually admitted a broader category of coconspirator statements. Nevertheless, a plurality of this Court found that the rule did not violate the Confrontation Clause and a fifth Member of the Court, Justice
Harlan, reasoned that the Confrontation Clause was not applicable at all. In Dutton the plurality stated that "we do not
question the validity of the co-conspirator exception applied
in the federal courts." 400 U. S., at 80. Upon closer examination today, we continue to affirm the validity of the use of
co-conspirator statements, and we decline to require a show13
The court in Ordonez found a Confrontation Clause violation because
the Government, after introducing drug ledgers containing entries made
by unidentified co-conspirators, did not adequately demonstrate that it was
totally unable to identify those conspirators .

.
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ing of the declarant's unavailability as a prerequisite to their
admission.
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
It is so ordered.
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: Case held for United States v. lnadi, No. 84-1580
~o.

85-705 Molt v. United States

Petitioner, among 40 others, was charged with conducting
a drug smuggling operation. At triaL five co-defandants
testified against petitioner, recounting many conversations among
other conspirators. These statements came within the exception
of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (2) (E). Petitioner argued that
the admission of these statements violnted the Confrontation
Clause. No showing of unnvailability was made, and there was no
cross-examination. ~he CA7 affirmed the conviction, reasoning
that there was no Confrontation Clauqe violation.
The reasoning of the CA7 d~es not apoear to be precisely
the same as the opinion in lnadi, but the result is the same. 1
recommend denial.

L.F.P.,

Jr.
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March 18, 1986
MEMORANDUM TO

•rHE

CONFERENCE

Re: Case held for. United States v. lnadi, No. 84-1580
No. 85-1 Ohio v. Adkins
No. 85-393 Ohio v. Counts
ln two separate trial arisinq out of the same
facts, petitioners were convicteo of aqqravated robbery,
kidnapping, and aqqravated murder. During separate oolice
interrogation, petitioner Adkins mointained that Counts had
executed the robbery, kidnappinq, and murder . Petitioner
Counts essentially confessed to the robbery but maintained
that Adkins had executed the kidnapping and murder. ~he
statements were in agreement as to other details of the
crimes. r~hen thev \-tere brought into the same room, both men
adhered to their prior statements. During Adkins trial,
police testified as to Counts ' accusations at the ioint confrontation. During Counts ' trial, police testified as to
Adkins' accusations at the ioint confrontation. Neither
petitioner. was cross-examined at the other's trial. The
Ohio Court of AppPats rPv~rs~d the convjctions. ThP court
reasoned that cross-ex~mination at trial is generally rPquired, citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 u.s. 56 (1.980}. The
court recognize~possible excePtion t''hen the testimony is
otherwise a~missible under state law, but found that these
statements did not fall under any such exception. No showing of unavailability was made, nor was there an additional
showing that the evidence was reliable despite being hearsay. 'l'he Ohio Supreme Court denied discretionarY review.
The reasoning of lnadi depends in part on the fact
that the statements were made in furtherance of and in the
course of a conspiracy , thereby satisfying the requirements
of Federal Rule of &vidence 80l(d) (2) (E) . In this case, the
statements were subsequent to the "conspiracy" , during police questioning . ln addition, the petitioners were not
prosecuted for a conspiracy at all . For these reasons ,
lnadi does not control this case. To the extent that the
confessions were interlockinq , a hold for Lee v . Illinois,
No . 84-6807 might be appropriate . ln these-cases, however,
the confessions were not even "interlocking" under the formulation in Parker v . Randolph , 442 u. s. 62 (1979} (plurality opinion)--the case that Lee interprets , see slip op . at
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14-16. Therefore, 1 recommend that the petitions in these
cases be denied.

L.F.P., Jr.
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